Going back to pre-September 11^th, on one side of the media ledger there was Hillary Clinton vs. Rudy Giuliani, Hillary Clinton vs. Rick Lazio, a presidential campaign that went into extra innings, Rudy’s health, Judy Nathan, next year’s governor’s race, and then, more recently, the World Trade Center attack, Anthrax, and the World Series which lasted through the weekend before the election.

In fairness, although the attention squeeze on this year’s election contest was unusual, that the candidate field was dominated by a somewhat lackluster group of office-seekers is in keeping with New York City history. With each choice for mayor, Gotham voters seem to rotate between flamboyant show-stoppers and less dramatic, off-Broadway types. So Wagner, of the dull crowd, is replaced by Lindsay, a Broadway lights star, followed by Beame, then Koch, then Dinkins, Giuliani and in 2001, the six non-marquee candidates, with Michael Bloomberg eventually emerging victorious.

If I had to rank order the most important items that shaped this election, I would start with the attack on the World Trade Center, followed by Rudy Giuliani, Mark Green, a tie for fourth place between the Reverend Al Sharpton and Freddie Ferrer, and then, Mike Bloomberg and his campaign war chest.

The attack on the World Trade Center cast a huge shadow on New York City and its politics. It stopped the primary on September 11th and resulted in postponed primary and runoff elections. It occupied voters’ attention and created a situation where there was less time for post-primary, post-runoff Democrats to heal rifts between Mark Green and Freddie Ferrer.

The attack on the World Trade Center also played a major role in shifting the city’s agenda in the direction of GOP candidate Michael Bloomberg. As education took a backseat to the economy as the most pressing concern for the New York City electorate, Bloomberg became for more voters the right man for these unusual times. 43% said in exit polls that the economy/jobs was the number one issue facing the city and Bloomberg was the choice of 59% of those voters.

The events of September 11^th and its aftermath placed outgoing Mayor Rudy Giuliani in a unique role in the city’s history. It is very difficult for an established political persona to shed his skin and be seen in a different light at the twilight of his tenure. With the exception of when Giuliani and his staff attempted to ride the wave of new found popularity to abolish term limits or to extend his rein by three months - a brief reappearance of the old Rudy - the new, old Rudy emerged during the crisis as a larger than life force in the city.

He dominated page one from day one of this campaign and even more so following September 11^th.

Marist polls monitored New Yorkers’ reactions to the World Trade Center attack and how voters felt about Mayor Giuliani and altering the election calendar. The political leadership in Albany ultimately reacted to the Mayor’s overtures in a manner consistent with public opinion. Overall, voters thought Giuliani was doing a terrific job during the crisis, and were inclined to vote for him if he were a candidate for re-election. But the electorate did not want to change the election rules to extend Giuliani’s time in office. The Mayor’s imploring of New Yorkers during this crisis to return to life as normal carried over to term limits and his hopes for a three-month extension. Voters did not want to change the election rules for him.

Ironically, the political adage "where you stand, depends upon where you sit" was evident in the debate over abolishing term limits. Proponents of the term limit law were more inclined to put aside this barrier so that Giuliani could stay in office longer, whereas original opponents of term limits rallied under its banner to have the election continue as planned.

Mayor Giuliani’s efforts on behalf of the Bloomberg candidacy were a major factor in determining the election outcome. Although it is typically difficult to transfer popularity through endorsements, this year was different. The endorsement ads of Bloomberg by Giuliani helped position Bloomberg as the heir to the Giuliani legacy, cemented Bloomberg’s image as the businessman/atypical politician New York now needed, and overall, made Bloomberg seem less of a risk in these uncertain times.

Finally, on Giuliani’s role, the mayor set the expectation’s bar for Bloomberg and Green at a high level. It is not unusual for non-incumbent office-seekers to suffer from a stature gap against a popular incumbent, leaving them only the argument that they will rise to the occasion to meet future challenges. But, this time, the stature gap was exceptionally wide because the situation was so critical, Giuliani was so respected, and the ads carved out by Bloomberg and Green were typical; that is, until the Giuliani endorsement ad for Bloomberg which legitimized his candidacy and the ill-conceived eleventh hour "Kill it, kill it" ad by Green.

Mark Green awoke on four mornings this fall anticipating that he would carry the day in the voting booths. The first test for Green was the morning of the World Trade Center attack, the day of the Democratic primary, then there was the rescheduled primary when he finished second to Ferrer, setting the stage for the bitter runoff which Green narrowly won. In the process, Green planted the seeds for his eventual undoing with the Latino community. Finally, there was Election Day itself where Green, having squandered a double-digit lead, narrowly lost to Bloomberg.

Green’s failings as a candidate are revealed in mistakes he made. High on the list was his claim that he would have matched or surpassed Giuliani in handling the World Trade Center crisis had he been mayor; a Green comment that Bloomberg capitalized on in frequently aired TV ads. Green also managed during the primary and general election campaign to at best, annoy, or at worse, offend most of his potential support. From minority voters, especially in the Latino community, who Green never seemed to grasp the depth of their displeasure, to white liberal voters who eventually cooled to the Green candidacy, things went decidedly downhill for him. A case in point, among white liberal voters, Green’s lead over Bloomberg was cut in half from Marist’s poll one week before the general election to the poll conducted on the eve of Election Day.

Green’s final weekend push for Democratic unity, most of the undecided voters were Democrats, fell far short of its goal as Ferrer did not attend the Friday night unity dinner, the Reverend Sharpton was less than encouraging throughout the closing days of the campaign to the African-American community to cast its vote for Green, and the organizer of the Green dinner, Miramax’s Harvey Weinstein who reportedly moved to Bloomberg by Election Day. As the politics-as-usual squabbling on the Green side escalated, Bloomberg’s "I’m a businessman, not a typical politician" approach stood out in contrast.

Green had from the start embarked on a front-runner strategy aimed at maintaining an early lead in the primary and later, in the general election. This meant, among other things, that he stayed cautious in public pronouncements and limited debate time with his opponents.

Unfortunately for Green, as his lead evaporated in both the primary and general election campaigns, he had to abort his initial plans and resort to negative ads, first against, Ferrer, and then, against Bloomberg.

Although enjoying early wide leads in both of these matchups, Green’s support was never firmly committed and the low visibility of the mayoral campaign generally created a large pool of undecided voters. The combination of these two factors represented a prescription for disaster for Green, which he narrowly avoided against Ferrer, but was unsuccessful in escaping against Bloomberg.

For a Republican to win citywide in a town where there are five Democrats for every Republican, one of two circumstances must be present: first, there needs to be a significant rift in the Democratic party; or second, there needs to be a major city crisis. In this election, both were in abundance.

In addition, although Bloomberg was a newcomer to campaigning, the team he assembled to run his effort was anything but new to politics. This was not "amateur hour." His TV ads, amply funded, were a useful way to break through to voters who were more often than not concentrating on other matters.

Of course, Bloomberg was in a position to spend his way into people’s living rooms. But money alone does not account for his success. Other high spending candidates have come up short of victory, or even respectability.

Mark Green, for his side of the cash flow, had enough money to win. He certainly spent beyond the threshold necessary to reach out to voters if the message and the candidate are right.

One last observation on campaign 2001. This was a time in New York City politics where the voters wanted to connect. It was a serious time and voters had views they were eager to express. We saw this in Marist’s polling where daily yields far exceeded normal for an electorate that is typically difficult to reach.

But with excessive negative ads, voters were presented with approaches more in keeping with campaign trends both in New York and elsewhere that have increasingly turned voters off. The Bloomberg and Green campaigns stood out as particularly superficial this year given what people in New York City were experiencing. The low voter turnout on Election Day reflected this gap between the electorate and candidates.

The biggest failing of the process in 2001 is the continuing chasm that exists between campaigning and governing. Again, this is the trend in American politics. One result of campaigns missing the mood of voters is that, for example, when it comes to Mayor-elect Bloomberg, there is little from the campaign that tells New Yorkers what to expect now. Voters don’t really know much about him or his plans. And this mayor will assume office at a time when, if nothing else, New Yorkers have witnessed how much mayor’s matter.